Economics Webinar - Buying Reputation as a Signal of Quality: Evidence from an Online Marketplace

3:00pm - 4:30pm
https://hkust.zoom.us/j/9687909998?pwd=VWRKSUNucHZaUC9GT3ZNaldBcnJPdz09

Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao’s “reward-for-feedback” mechanism. High-quality products, especially without established feedback, are chosen for feedback rewards, which cause sales to increase by 36%. Marketplaces and consumers can therefore benefit from allowing sellers to buy feedback and signal their high-quality products in the process.

講者/ 表演者:
Prof. Lingfang (Ivy) Li
Fudan University

https://www.fdsm.fudan.edu.cn/en/teacher/preview.aspx?UID=139822

語言
英文
適合對象
校友
教職員
研究生
主辦單位
經濟學系
聯絡方法

Julie Wong tel: 2358 7621 / email: fnjuwong@ust.hk

新增活動
請各校內團體將活動發布至大學活動日曆。